Posts from Entrepreneur

Parting Ways With A Founding Team Member

One of the hardest things for an entrepreneur is to part ways with a co-founder or founding team member. Those early days putting together the plan, building the product, and building the team are formative and powerful. The loyalties that develop during that time are strong and hard to break.

Running a business is not an easy job. You have to do what is right for the business and that often conflicts with what is right for you.

I have seen this so many times now. One of the founders or early team members performs heroic work, most often in building the product. But as the company grows and engineering turns into a team effort, that person or persons can't work well in the team environment. And then the entrepreneur is faced with a painful decision. How can you fire someone who was so impactful and gave so much of themselves in getting the company off the ground? What message does that send to the rest of the team? How can I fire my friend?

But you have to do it. What works when you are five or ten people often does not work when you are fifty or more. Rock stars are rarely good team players. And the best developers are rarely the best managers. The person who made your first sale is rarely the right person to manage a team of a dozen salespeople.

When you realize you have to do this, you should act. Don't let your unease with the decision let you procrastinate on it. And be generous. I am in favor of vesting more stock than is contractually obligated to be vested. And severance so the person can take some time and decompress is another way to be generous. Most of all, be generous with the way you talk about the person's contributions. Call them a founder if they are a founder. Recognize their contributions both internally and externally and continue to do so. And help them find another situation where they can work their magic again.

I believe that how you handle a person's departure has more impact on morale than the departure itself, particularly if the remaining team understands why the departure is necessary. So being generous financially and in your communications and taking the time to clearly explain the departure to the team are both critical in building and maintaining morale and making your company a great place to work.

If I look back at our most successful investments over the almost 25 years that I have been in the venture capital business, almost every single one of them has seen a founder or critical founding team member shown the door as the company scaled. It's almost inevitable. So if you are starting a company, understand that you will face this moment at some point. It will not be pleasant. But if is something you have to deal with. So talk to your mentors, coaches, and board members. Get their advice. And take the action, do it well, and do it right.

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That Person Won't Scale

One of the best things to happen to startup land this spring is the arrival of Ben Horowitz as a serious blogger. Like his partner Marc Andreessen, Ben has a ton of great experiences to share and he is doing just that right now.

I particularly like his post on evaluating whether an executive "will scale." Ben writes:

evaluating people against the future needs of the company based on a theoretical view of how they will perform is counter-productive

I see this all the time in VC and startup land. An entrepreneur will come into our office and we will be discussing him or her after they leave. Someone will ask "will they scale into a big company CEO?" The answer as Ben points out so well is "who knows?"

Ben also points out that managing a lot of people well is a learned skill:

Managing at scale is a learned skill rather than a natural ability. Nobody comes out of the womb knowing how to manage a thousand people. Everybody learns at some point.

This is why I am a huge fan of getting mentors on the board and CEO coaches into the picture. Good VCs will try to help an entrepreneur "scale" but there is always going to be a tension between the investor and the entrepreneur and it is a good idea to get some other people involved if the entrepreneur wants to "scale" into a leader of hundreds or thousands.

The next time I hear someone says "that person won't scale" I am going to send them to read Ben's post.

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From Hopes and Dreams to The Real Thing

Companies start out as hopes and dreams and stay there for at least a little while. Even after the product has been launched and users are jumping aboard, the company is still in hopes and dreams mode.

But eventually one of three things happens to a company; it goes out of business, it gets sold, or it becomes a real business.

And one of the most interesting things to watch and learn from, as an entrepreneur or investor in entrepreneurs, is what happens when you go from hopes and dreams to the real thing.

There is a big chasm between hopes and dreams and the real thing. Companies need to grow up and go through the ugly adolescent phase. They start to doubt themselves, they start to churn employees, they may even go through a management change or two. Getting across this chasm is hard, it takes tenacity, both from the entrepreneur and team and from the investors. Everyone has to stay the course, buy into the plan, and execute it.

Crossing the chasm to the real thing is not nearly as fun as the hopes and dreams phase. It is hard work and it happens after the gushing media has left your company for the shiny new thing. Your company will take a morale hit and you will have to lead it through this phase.

But getting to the other side is worth all of it. There is nothing as satisfying in entrepreneur land than having a profitable growing sustainable business that doesn't need another dime of anyone else's capital. I have watched entrepreneurs stand up in front of their teams and tell them that they've reached that point. I get chills every time I see it.

Many entrepreneurs choose to sell their companies during the hopes and dreams phase. I can understand why. When someone is paying you in advance for all the hard work you are going to have to do in the future, it is tempting to take it. And there is always the chance that you won't cross the chasm and you'll end up in the deal pool at the bottom.

I don't like to stand in the way of those decisions. But I also like to remind entrepreneurs that with the right amount of capital, the right team, and the right plan, they will get across the chasm and I like to point out what waits for them on the other side.

I also like to advise entrepreneurs to take advantage of the financing environment that is available to them during the hopes and dreams phase. It is a strange situation. Your company will be worth more to investors during the hopes and dreams phase than it will be worth while you are crossing the chasm. So you should raise enough capital at hopes and dreams valuations to get across. If you don't, a down round is waiting for you as yet another challenge while you are crossing the chasm.

Companies with no revenues but big potential are worth whatever the market will bear. But once you have revenues and are heading towards earnings, the market will be able to better assess what you are worth. Revenues and earnings multiples will enter the valuation discussions. And most of the time, revenues and earnings multiples will result in a lower number than hopes and dreams, at least for a while.

Facebook is a great example of this. Microsoft paid a "hopes and dreams" valuation of $15bn a few years ago while Facebook was growing fast but just starting to generate revenue. That round didn't get Facebook all the way across the chasm and there was that difficult financing in which Facebook got offers from private equity firms in the $3bn to $5bn range. Facebook eventually concluded a "down round" at $10bn with DST. And that round got them all the way across the chasm and now Facebook is profitable and its shares are trading at $25bn in the secondary markets.

Many companies go through this valuation roller coaster ride as they cross the chasm. Don't fret too much about it. Once you decide to go for it, you need to be focused on the end game and interim valuations don't matter too much as long as you hold on to enough of the business for yourself and your team. The right investors matter a lot in that scenario.

Anyway, this post is getting a bit too long for my taste so I'll wrap it up. The best companies I've been involved with in my 25 years in the VC business are not always the big exits. I enjoy watching an entrepreneur and a team spend a decade or more building a real business that creates sustainable value for everyone. And that process is never pretty from start to finish. Don't worry about that. Embrace it. It is just another challenge to be met. You can cross the chasm from hopes and dreams to the real thing if you have the tenacity, the team, the plan, and the right capital partners. And when you do, it is the greatest feeling.

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Mastering The VC Game

My friend and fellow VC Jeff Bussgang has written an excellent book about entrepreneurs and VCs called “Mastering The VC Game.” If you are an entrepreneur who plans to work with VCs at some point in your career, you should read the book. It’s a fast read. You could easily read it in a cross country flight.

It’s full of stories about entrepreneurs and VCs and how they worked together. There is one about me and Jack Dorsey and Twitter that TechCrunch has excerpted today. 

I’m not feeling very well today, I think it’s allergies but I’m not sure. So I don’t have a lot in me right now. So instead of reading AVC today, go to Techcrunch and read the excerpt and then hopefully you’ll want to go to Amazon and buy the book.

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Nature vs Nurture and Entrepreneurship

I went down to Philly yesterday and spent the afternoon with students and faculty at Wharton Entrepreneurial Programs, the entity that administers the entrepreneurship major/courses at Wharton and runs a bunch of fantastic "outreach" programs like the Venture Initiation Program. 

WEP is run by Professor Raffi Amit and as we were making our way from one meeting to another, I said to Raffi that "you can't teach people to be entrepreneurs but you can teach entrepreneurs business." He replied to me that his research into the topic suggests that "there are no unique and defining characteristics of entrepreneurs" which leads him to believe that you can in fact teach people to be entrepreneurs.

That threw me and I've been ruminating on his conclusion ever since. I've been working with entrepreneurs for almost 25 years now and it is ingrained in my mind that someone is either born an entrepreneur or is not.

And I also believe that there are "unique and defining characteristics of entrepreneurs." Here are some of the ones I observe most frequently:

1) A stubborn belief in one's self

2) A confidence bordering on arrogance

3) A desire to accept risk and ambiguity, and the ability to live with them

4) An ability to construct a vision and sell it to many others

5) A magnet for talent

I accept that Raffi may be right. I will get my hands on his research and read it. And maybe it will change my mind on this topic. 

Venture Capital is a lot about pattern recognition. You learn to make quick judgements based on things you've observed in the past. And judgements about people are among the most important decisions we make. So this is a very important topic to me.

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Plant More Seeds vs Tending The Crop

One of the questions facing venture capitalists in the internet/web sector is how big a portfolio is optimal. The economics of internet/web startups means the capital requirements for each investment are often lower and the best ones get profitable on one or two rounds of investment. That leads many venture capital firms participating in this sector to conclude that they need to build larger portfolios because the investments per portfolio company will be smaller.

When my partner Brad and I started Union Square Ventures back in 2003, we constructed a model portfolio for a $100mm fund. We assumed we'd start with an average investment of $1.5mm to $3mm and that our average investment would be $6-8mm. We thought we would make 12-14 investments. We raised $125mm so the numbers are 25% larger, but we ended up making 21 investments. If we had raised $100mm, we'd have made 17 investments. So over the course of the four year investment period of our first fund, we increased the number of investments we decided was optimal by 30%.

When we planned for our second fund in 2007, we modeled a $150mm fund with 30 investments, an average of $5mm per company, reflecting a further 20% increase in the investments/fund ratio.

There's another factor at work here. All early stage VCs understand that there will be losses/churn in the portfolio. Longtime readers of this blog know that I like to talk about the 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 model in which 1/3 of the investments are wipeouts, 1/3 return capital but are underperformers, and 1/3 are winners that produce all of the returns. When you have an investment flow dynamic where the early rounds require very small amounts of capital but the later rounds in the winners can require a lot of capital (which is very much the case in the internet/web sector), then it behooves you to make lots of small investments, see which ones become the big winners, and then go "all in" on the winners.

There are quite a few experienced VCs making early stage investments in the internet/web sector now. And many of them have developed models that allow them to build and manage larger portfolios. Probably the best example of this is First Round Capital, which got started a year or two after Union Square Ventures but now has over 70 portfolio companies. But there are plenty of other venture capital firms, large and small, new and established, that have figured out that they need to make more smaller earlier investments in the internet/web sector.

The challenge all of this presents is how a VC should allocate his/her time. You can spend the majority of time hunting for deals (planting seeds) or you can spend the majority of your time working with the portfolio companies (tending the crop). Not all of the portfolio companies need a VC's help. Many entrepreneurs are highly self sufficient. That's a good thing. But every entrepreneur can use some help now and then and some need a lot. And the best VCs make it a point to be there when the entrepreneur needs you. And that is time consuming. It's very time consuming if you have ten or more portfolio companies and you make it a point to be a "valued added" VC.

I am "old school" in some things related to the venture business. It's probably because I got my apprenticeship in the mid 80s and have a hard time giving up old habits. One of them is "the portfolio comes first." I was talking to my partners the other day about the best use of our time. We have a great portfolio of companies that have created a lot of value and are poised to create a lot more. If we can spend time helping these great companies become more valuable, will that result in greater returns to us and our investors than doing more deals? Hard to say, but my initial instinct is yes. Again, that's my "old school" training coming into play.

So that's the never ending debate inside the head of a VC. And it is certainly the debate inside my head these days. This doesn't mean that USV is going to do less investing in 2010. And it doesn't mean I am going to do less investing. I spent a fair bit of time recently laying out exactly what I want to invest in this coming year. We generally make 6-8 new investments per year, roughly 2-3 per partner and I expect we'll do that again in 2010.

But it does mean that we will be working a lot with our existing investments this year and we may not be the most aggressive firm out there chasing new deals. That bugs me at times. But I think it's the right choice for us, our investors, and our portfolio companies.

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Tenacity

Mark Suster (one of the best VC blogs) has a post up on Tenacity. He says:

Tenacity is probably the most important attribute in an entrepreneur.  It’s the person who never gives up – who never accepts “no” for an answer.  The world is filled with doubters who say that things can’t be done and then pronounce after the fact that they “knew it all along."

I agree with Mark that tenacity is a key attribute in successful entrepreneurs. It's hard to see it in a person in the short "get to know you" period you have on many investment opportunities. But if you can get to know an entrepreneur over a longer period of time, you can see it.

Avner Ronen, co-founder and CEO of Boxee, showed a lot of tenacity to me a few years back. As I outlined in the post announcing our investment in Boxee, Avner originally pitched us in mid 2007. At that time, they were pitching a hardware play. I said no. Then he came back in early 2008 with an open source software play. I said, "better, but no users". Then he came back in the summer of 2008 with 10,000 users and a nice growth curve. And we closed an investment in November of 2008.

Reece Pacheco is a young entrepreneur just getting going. He's an active member of this community so many of you know him already. He and I emailed early this week about a pitch meeting he had with a friend of mine for an angel investment. I pointed him to that Boxee story and told him that:

raising money is about turning nos into yeses

He was all over that. I've met Reece and I suspect he's got the required tenacity to be a great entrepreneur too. He's showing it right now as he is building his company, Home Field, and hearing a lot of nos, a few maybes, and just enough yeses to keep him and the team going.

Tenacity comes in all shapes, sizes, and sexes. It's an equal opportunity employer. But it's not easy to see and reveals itself over time. If you want to be a successful venture investor, keep your eye out for it. It will lead you to a lot more wins than losses.

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Valuation and Option Pool

One of the more contentious things in the negotiation between an entrepreneur and a VC over a financing, particularly an early stage financing, is the inclusion of an option pool in the pre-money valuation. As my friend Mark Pincus likes to say, "it's just another way to lower the price".

I'll accept that critique. And take it one step further. The option pool is absolutely a piece of the price negotiation. But it is a very important one as I'll explain.

But first, let me lay out a few things for those who aren't well versed in these matters. The pre-money valuation is the value of the company before the money comes in. Let's say we call it $4mm. And let's say the financing is $1mm. Then the post-money valuation is $5mm and the $1mm round is 20% dilutive ($1mm/$5mm).

But to the entrepreneur it might be a lot more dilutive due to the inclusion of the option pool in the pre-money valuation. Let's say that the VC's term sheet says that a 15% "fully diluted post money" option pool needs to be in the pre-money valuation. What that means is that the investor wants 15% of the company, after the financing is closed, to be in an option pool that has not been granted to anyone.

In the case of the $5mm post money valuation, that means there needs to be $750,000 worth of options in the pre-money valuation. If the pre-money valuation is $4mm, then that means the true pre-money valuation to the entreprenuer is $3.25mm. And therein lies Mark's critique that the option pool is just another way to lower the price.

I am sure I lost a few of you on all of that math. If you want to drill down on it, please leave a comment and we'll help you figure this out. It is very important you understand all of this if you are or want to be an entrepreneur who raises venture capital.

The bottom line is the deal I described leaves the entrepreneur and his/her shareholders with 65% of the company after the financing, the VC investor will own 20%, and there will be an option pool representing 15% of the company that has not been issued yet. The $1mm financing was not 20% dilutive, it was 35% dilutive.

So it is not surprising that entrepreneurs hate this provision and fight about it every time. And like most terms, VCs have been abusing it for years by asking for excessive option pools making the provision hated more than it needs to be.

The first point I'll make is that VCs should be upfront about this provision and the fact that it is simply about price. In the example above, I'd be happy to pay $3.25mm pre-money with no option pool. Or I'll pay $4mm pre-money with one. They are the same thing to me. What an entrepreneur needs to do is find out what the market price for their company is with and without an option pool in the number. Once they do that, the negotiation over this point is a lot less contentious.

The second point I'll make is that the option pool request needs to be reasonable and based on some kind of budget. I generally ask the entrepreneur to put enough options into the "pre-money pool" to fund the hiring and retention needs of the company until the next financing. My thinking on this is that I don't want to get diluted between financings. So I like to see a headcount based hiring plan with expected options against each hire combined with a retention plan for all current employees who will need additional option grants.

In most of the early stage financings I've done in the past few years this work on the option pool has shown a need for around 10% in unissued options. I've seen it as big as 15% but that is rare. I've also seen it as low as 5%, but that is even more rare. But the point is this; don't guess or negotiate this number. Do the work, figure it out, and put it in the pre-money and then negotiate price.

I'll wrap with a true story about this provision. When Mark and I were negotiating the first round of financing for Zynga, we got into a real tussle about this provision. He did not want an option pool in the pre-money valuation. I did. Once we agreed that it was just a fight about price, the conversation got easier. I got him to give me an estimate of the pool he would need. We added it to the valuation we had agreed to. He got an increase in price, I got an option pool. And I got one of the best investments I've ever made.

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Swinging For The Fences

There has been a lot of talk about young entrepreneurs creating all the great companies; Gates, Jobs, Yang/Filo, Bezos, Dell, Brin/Page, Zuckerberg, etc, etc.

I agree that visionary young people are worth backing and we do a lot of that at Union Square Ventures.

But there is another kind of entrepreneur I love backing even more. It's the serial entrepreneur who has had a number of successes under their belt and now wants to swing for the fences. We have a bunch of them in our portfolio and there is nothing more fun than watching someone who has a ton of experience get behind the wheel and really step on the gas.

When someone has two or three startups under their belt, they understand a bunch of things that a first time entrepreneur doesn't. They understand the value of setting a very clear vision and getting everyone on that page. They understand that they need to hire the very best people. They understand how to raise capital and pick their investors carefully. They understand how to make quick decisions and not let issues fester. They have a rolodex of talented people and potential business partners they can get on the phone or email quickly when they need them. Most of all, they ooze confidence and make everyone better around them.

These entrepreneurs usually have enough money in the bank that they are not looking for a payday. They don't build their companies to flip. They build their companies to go all the way. They are doing it for money, but they are also doing it for the thrill of the game, for ego, and to build a legacy. Those are very powerful motivators, much more powerful than money if you ask me.

If you look at our portfolio, you'll see quite a few startups created by young visionaries and quite a few startups created by serial entrepreneurs who are swinging for the fences. There isn't much else to be honest.

We are open to all kinds of entrepreneurs and we don't screen for age or track record. If you have built a web service that fits into our investment thesis, you'll get a hearing at our firm regardless of who you are and what you have done. But it is also true that we tend to back young visionary founders and successful serial entrepreneurs most of the time. That's because we've made a lot of money doing those two things and not so much doing anything else.

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Paying To Pitch

Jason Calacanis has taken on a new cause, outing angel groups that charge entrepreneurs to pitch. I agree with Jason that any angel group that charges an entrepreneur to pitch should be avoided. It suggests to me that the group is more about making money on pitch fees than investing.

I've also seen "startup fundraising agents" out there that charge entrepreneurs upfront cash to make intros to potential investors. They should also be avoided. A basic rule of thumb for fundraising agents is that they must work on a success fee basis or you should not use them. Otherwise, they have no incentive to see you actually get funded.

Both the agent groups and startup agents that want to charge upfront cash make the argument that it is a quality filter. But that is nonsense. Some of the best startups I've ever seen were totally broke and living and working in a friend's apartment. And some of the worst were well off and working in fancy offices. The ability of a startup to pay has absolutely nothing with the quality of the team and the idea.

Like any other sector, the startup sector has its share of scams and scam artists. I think it is great that Jason is outing them.

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