Posts from Public company

Lockups and Insider Selling

There is a lot of sturm und drang out there in the worlds of social media, finacial media, and just plain media about all the lockups coming off and all the insider selling going on in some big internet stocks. As someone who has played this game a few times, I tought I'd post some thoughts about this.

First and foremost, this post has nothing to do with what USV has done, might do, or is thinking about doing with specific stocks we might own or not. That's a disclaimer for those who aren't familiar with one.

When a venture backed company goes public and is worth billions (or even hundreds of millions), the investors who provided the early capital to that company are going to be sitting on a lot of stock. They can easily own 15-20% or more of these companies. But even if they own less than 10% (as Accel Partners does in Facebook), they can be looking at billions of dollars of value.

It is an investors job to return capital. I will say that again. It is an investors job to return capital. That is how we are measured. Paper gains are fine. But at the end of the day, an investor will be measured by the amount of cash or liquid stock they return divided by the amount of cash that was invested in their fund. A multiple of three is good for a venture capital fund. A multiple of five is great. A multiple of ten is once a decade.

When an investor is looking at a single holding being worth three, five, or possibly ten times their entire fund, you can be sure they are looking to lock in that gain. That's a recipe for fantastic performance and the downside of not locking that in is a lot bigger than the upside of another one or two times their fund size.

And then there's the question of whether venture capital firms are good public market investors and whether they should be managing/holding public stocks. I don't have any hard data here, but my anecdotal data says that we are terrible public market investors. That is why many VC firms have a policy of moving the public stocks out of their portfolios as quickly as they can.

I think that is a good policy. Venture capital is about capturing the value between the startup phase and the public company phase. Others should be focused on capturing the value post the public offering.

So let's go back to the expiration of lockups and the waves of insider selling that result. This is to be expected and in fact is expected by the public markets. Look at all of the short positions that get built up in the locked up newly minted public companies in the weeks before the lockups come off. Investors know that a ton of stock is going to hit the markets and they make bets that it will impact the stock price and in most cases it does impact the stock price. As JLM likes to say "this generation did not invent sex." This has been going on since I got into the venture capital business in the mid 80s and I expect its been going on for a lot longer than that.

So to all the folks out there who are shocked and outraged at all the insider selling going on, I would suggest they park their outrage at the door of capitalism. Those who took the risk of losing all the capital they bet on 20 year old Mark Zuckerberg are entitled to their return. And they will get it. And anyone who thinks otherwise has their head in the sand.

#VC & Technology

The Board Of Directors - Selecting, Electing & Evolving

Every company should have a Board Of Directors. At the start it can simply be a one person board consisting of the founder. But it should not stay that way for long. Because if you are your own board, you won't get any of the benefits that come with having a board. These benefits include, but are not limited to, advice, counsel, relationships, experience, and accountability.

The shareholders elect the Board of Directors. But there is usually a nominating entity that puts directors up for election by the shareholders. If the founder controls the company, then he/she is usually that nominating entity.

I am a fan of a three person Board early on in a company's life. I generally recommend that a founder put himself/herself on the board along with two other people they trust and respect. The election of directors in this scenario is simply a matter of the controlling shareholder voting them in.

This situation changes a bit when investors get involved. If the founder retains control, then the situation does not have to change. The founder can still nominate and elect the directors they want on the board. However, investors can and will negotiate for a Board seat in some situations. This is less common for angel investors and more common for venture capital investors.

The way investors negotiate for a board seat is usually via something called a Shareholders Agreement. This is an agreement between all the shareholders of the company. It contains a bunch of provisions, but one of the provisions can be an agreement that the shareholders of the company will vote for a representative of a certain investor in the election of the Board of Directors. The representative can even be named specifically. For many of the Boards I am on, this is how my seat is elected. For venture capital investments, this is a very typical provision.

Adding an investor Director does not mean that the founder loses control of the Board. It can remain a three person Board with one investor director and two founder directors. Or the Board can be expanded to five and the investors can take one or two seats and the founder can control the rest. These two situations are common scenarios when the founders control the company.

As a company moves from founder control to investor control, the notion of an independent director crops up. And independent director is a director who does not represent either the founder or the investors. I am a big fan of independent directors and like to see them on the Boards I am on. Boards that are full of vested interests are not good boards. The more independent minded the Board becomes, the better it usually is.

When the founder loses control of the company (usually by selling a majority of the stock to investors), it does not mean the investors should control the Board. In fact, I would argue that an investor controlled Board is the worst possible situation. Investors usually have a narrow set of interests that involve how much money they are going to make (or lose) on their investment. It is the rare investor who takes a broader and more holistic view of the company. So while investor directors are a neccessary evil in many companies, they should not dominate or control the board. The founder should control the board in a company he or she controls and independent directors should control a board where the founder does not control the company.

When and if a company goes public, the Shareholders Agreement will terminate and public company governance standards will dictate how a board is selected and elected. There will most likely be a comittee of the Board that is called the Nominating Committee. That committee will select a slate of directors that will be put up for election by all the shareholders of the company at the annual meeting. Most public company Boards have staggered Board terms such that a subset of the Board is elected every year. Three year and four year terms are most common.

It is possible for the shareholders to put up an alternative slate. In theory, this approach could be used in both private and public companies, but in reality it is almost entirely limited to public companies. This will be percieved as a hostile move by most companies and they will fight the alternative slate of directors. This "aternative slate" approach is most commonly taken by "activist investors" who take a meaningful minority stake in a public company and agitate for changes in the Baord, Management, and strategic direction of the company. But it can also be used in a hostile takeover effort.  It is very very rare for an alternative slate to take control of a company, but it is fairly common for a new director or two to get elected in this way.

Boards should evolve. Boards should recruit new members on a regular basis. Board members should have term limits. I like the four year term. But I've been on Boards for much longer. I'm in my thirteenth year on one board and my eleventh on another. These are not ideal situations but they involve companies I invested in while I was with my prior venture capital firm and I have a responsibility to my partners and the founders to see these situations through.

A much better example is Twitter, where I was the first outside Director, taking a board seat when Twitter was formed in the spinout from Obvious and USV made its initial investment. Over time Twitter added several investor directors and then started adding independent directors. By last fall, Twitter had the opportunity to create a board with two founders, a CEO, three independent directors, and one investor director. As a shareholder, that sounded like the right mix to me and I voluntarily stepped down along with my friend Bijan who had led the second round of investment.

The point of the Twitter story is that Boards evolve. In the first year it was me and two founders and a founding team member. In the second year it was me and Bijan, two founders and a founding team member. In the third year it was three investors, two founders, and two senior team members. In the fourth year, it was three investors, two founders, a CEO, and three independents. And now it is one investor, two founders, a CEO, and three independents. Many of these changes in the Twitter board happened at the time of financings. That is typical of a venture backed company.

In summary, the shareholders elect the Board. That is the essential truth in every company. But how they elect the directors can be very different from company to company. For public companies, it is largely the same for all. In private companies, as JLM would say "you get what you negotiate for" so negotiate the Board provisions carefully. They are important.

Most importantly, build a great board. They are not that common. But you owe it to your company to do that for it.

#MBA Mondays

The Sub $1bn Revenues IPO Act

There's a bill in Congress to reduce the regulatory burdens for public companies that have less than $1bn in revenues and/or have been public for less than five years.  The name is too long so I call it the "sub $1bn IPO bill."

This is a good bill. This undoes some of the bad stuff done to smaller public companies in Sarbox.

It should become law. I hope it will.

Here are some blog posts on this topic.

#VC & Technology

Some Thoughts On The IPO Market For Web Companies

We have an IPO market for web companies again. I don't have all the names in front of me, but this year has brought IPOs for Pandora, LinkedIn, Groupon, Zynga, and TripAdvisor. These five companies are all trading for north of $1bn market cap. Pandora is at ~$1.5bn. LinkedIn is at ~$6bn. Groupon is at ~$15bn, Zynga is at ~$7bn, and TripAdvisor is at ~$3.5bn.

We can (and surely will in the comments) argue about these valuations. Some will say they are too high. Some will say they are too low. That's what makes a market. But in the aggregate, these valuations do not seem ridiculous to me. The public market investors are valuing these companies at prices that have some rationality to them.

What is possibly more interesting is that the public markets are valuing these companies at less than the late stage private market might value them at. Again, I don't have the data in front of me (I'm on vacation), but I believe that some of these companies had private financings at our above these current market caps.

The past decade (post Internet bubble, post Sarbox) brought a new normal to the late stage venture capital market. Companies are staying private longer. They are doing multiple rounds of growth financing privately. And they are doing multiple rounds of secondary liquidity for the founders, angels, and early investors. Mike Moritz calls these financings the "new IPOs".

This "new normal" is allowing these companies to stay private and develop into real businesses. With a lot of revenue. The five companies I mentioned at the top of this post will have close to $5bn in revenue this year. The company with the least amount of revenue is Pandora which, as of its last quarterly report, is operating at a $300mm annual revenue run rate.

These companies also have built sophisticated management teams that are highly capable of managing a business to meet the expectations of public market investors. They have strong operating executives, strong financial executives, and strong product and engineering leadership. They should be well run public companies.

The five companies I mentioned at the top of this post are carrying a combined market cap of $33bn. So they trade at an average of 6.6x revenues. And that is not including the cash they have on their balance sheets. I am not going to do the math, but I would bet if you back out the excess cash, you might see revenue multiples of less than 6x for this cohort. These are full valuations in a historical context, but these are not crazy valuations. If these companies can continue to grow at the rates they are currently growing, and if they can generate significant cash flow from their businesses (some of these companies already are doing that), then they should be more valuable in the next couple years, generating gains for the public market investors who hold the stock.

When Zynga was pricing its offering last week and getting ready to start trading its stock, I got a note from a friend who said "let's hope for a '99 style first day pop." I responded that was the last thing I wanted to see. And thankfully we did not get that.

It is not healthy for companies to trade at prices well beyond what they are worth. It puts incredible pressure on the team to deliver results that can't be delivered. And when the stock inevitably comes back to reality, the team feels like they somehow failed. Morale is impacted. The whole things is madness. And who benefits from that first day pop? Only the best customers of the banks who led the offerings. Why should they get a windfall when they did nothing to build the company and when they will be out of the stock so fast it will make your head spin?

The IPO market for web companies we have right now is rationale. We can argue whether it is pricing thse offerings correctly. But it feels about right to me. I believe we will see a bunch of IPOs next year, led by Facebook, which is the poster child of this whole "stay private longer" movement. If we as an industry can be patient, keep our companies private longer until they are truly IPO ready, then we should have a sustainable IPO market. That's where we seem to be headed. Let's not get greedy and screw it up.

Disclosure: USV has a significant holding in Zynga therefore I am long that stock through my interest in USV.

#stocks#VC & Technology

Does Price Matter?

Most people assume that price is what matters most in a financial transaction. When you are raising money, you want to get the money at the highest price (least dilution). When you are selling, you want to get the highest price for your company. But that is not always the case.

Price matters, but my experience says that it often does not matter the most. In many of the venture deals we have done in the past few years, our transaction valuation was not the highest price offered to the entrepreneur. But the entrepreneur chose us as their partners anyway.

In the majority of the sale transactions that have happened in our portfolio, there were higher bidders for the company than the chosen acquirer.

You can get away with this behavior if you have a closely held business. If you have a public company, then you cannot. The Board has a fiduciary responsibility to get the best deal for the shareholders. And if you are a public company, that effectively means the highest price. That is one of many reasons I don't like being on public boards and operating as a public company.

Let's say you are one of two or three investors in a closely held startup company. Let's say that between the investors and the founders, the group owns ~90% of the company. And let's say that there are two purchasers. One is willing to pay $250mm in a clean transaction and the Board thinks they will be good owners of the business, will do everything possible to keep the team intact and the service vibrant. The other is willing to pay $300mm in a complex transaction, has a reputation for blowing up teams, and has been known to mess up the services they acquire. That would be a no brainer. The board should take the lower offer in a heartbeat, assuming they really want to sell the business.

When you are doing an important financial transaction that brings a new influential owner into the company, price matters but is not the most important issue. The most important issue is the chemistry between the existing owners and the new investor/owner and the reputation of the new investor/owner. You want to use the market to surface the right valuation band and you should do the transaction in that band. But once you have done that, you should optimize for chemistry and fit. And let price fall somewhere in the "market band."

If you cannot find an investor/owner who is a good fit in the "market band" then you should kill the process and not do a transaction unless you need to transaction to stay in business. If you are doing a transaction to stay in business, you have screwed up and put yourself in a bad position. And you should be prepared to be in a worse position soon. But that's the subject of another post.

So price matters but don't optimize for it. Not in a financing transaction. And not in a sale transaction. If you do, you will often regret it.

#VC & Technology

Stay Packages

There's an article on Gizmodo today about Palm's effort to retain key execs during its sale process. The headline says:

Palm Bribes Key Employees to Stick Around as SVP of Software Jumps Ship

I think that's an unfortunate choice of words. These are not "bribes", these are stay packages. And they are very common, including in the startup/venture capital world.

When the board of a company makes a decision to sell a business, it is best that they share that decision with the senior team, not just the CEO. The senior team is an important part of the business value a buyer will get for most transactions. And the buyer will want to meet with the senior team in due diligence. The stronger the team, the more value the company will fetch in the sale process.

But once you tell your senior team that the business is for sale, some of them, maybe all of them will start getting antsy. They will worry that the buyer will not want them. Or they will worry that the sale process will not succeed and then what will happen. Or they will worry that they'll end up working for a buyer that they don't want to work for. And so once you tell your senior team you are putting the company up for sale, you risk seeing all their resumes on the street.

Enter the "stay package." These are compensation packages that are specifically designed to keep the senior team and all valuable employees in the company through the sale process. They usually include a cash "sale bonus" which is paid when the sale transaction closes and additional stock options that should increase in value upon a sale transaction with vesting provisions that incent the recipient to stay at the buyer for some period of time.

This appears to be exactly what Palm did. The company is required to disclose such packages for its most senior managers because it is a public company. It does that through a filing called an 8K. AllThingsD has the Palm 8K filings posted on their blog if you want to read them.

Not only are stay packages common, they are best practices in sale processes where there is a risk of a talent drain. A Board should seriously consider them whenever a sale process is discussed. They are a critical part of maintaining and ideally enhancing shareholder value which is the Board's fiduciary responsibility. Calling them bribes misrepresents what they are for and why they are important for all stakeholders in the company.

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#VC & Technology